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Focus rural land policies on ecosystem services not 
agriculture 
 
Land policies around the world are weighted towards agricultural output. We argue that this leads 
to ineffective public expenditure, environmental harm and missed opportunities for use of rural 
resources. Applying ecosystems services thinking to the governance of rural land would secure 
greater social value. 
 
David Gawith and Ian Hodge 




Rural land can provide a broad range of outputs in addition to agricultural products 1,2, but with few 
mechanisms in place to incentivise delivery, these outputs remain underprovided and 
uncoordinated.  Governments do intervene but generally with separate policies and agencies for 
separate outputs and services. Efforts to meet various objectives in agriculture, water quality, flood 
management, wildlife conservation and forestry are often poorly coordinated. We argue for a new 
approach to rural land policy that will maximise the long-term social value of services deriving from 
ecosystems. This treats agricultural and other marketed products as provisioning services, alongside 
other environmental outputs for which there are no markets, such as biodiversity, water 
management, landscape, public access and carbon storage.  The policy directs land uses and 
management practices towards a balance of marketed and non-marketed outputs.  We propose a 
general framework for the development of an Ecosystem Services Policy (ESP) that offers an 
overarching and integrated approach to rural land policy.  
 
The need for change 
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In most countries, rural land policies are agriculturally-oriented3.  This reflects historical concerns 
about food security and a desire to compensate for relatively low incomes in the sector. But 
circumstances change. Food security now depends more on free and reliable trade and resilience4 
than it does on domestic production levels. Farm household incomes are often not systematically 
lower than household incomes generally5. Even where some farmers do face low incomes, it makes 
little sense to subsidise a whole sector in order to support a minority6.   
 
While agriculture is widely seen as a major supplier of public goods 7 particularly in cultural 
landscapes8 , agricultural policies are also perceived as responsible for environmental damage9,10,11. 
Agricultural policies distort commodity prices, inflate rural land prices and cushion inefficient 
producers against changes in the markets they sell to12,6.  Under strong competition for public 
finance, rural land policies need to demonstrate their value to society by correcting market failures, 
promoting the delivery of public goods 13 and securing resilience in ecosystems. Despite this, policies 
have continued to subsidise agriculture 14 due to influential agricultural lobbying and severe path 
dependency in policy formulation 15,16. For instance, over 70% of the European Union’s Common 
Agricultural Policy budget is directed specifically to farmers based simply on the area of land they 
farm, with minimal requirements to deliver any clear social benefiti. To correct for these failings, 
rural land policy should be re-thought from first principles. 
 
An ecosystem services policy (ESP) approach to rural land policy 
The benefits arising from the natural environment are commonly framed in terms of ecosystem 
services (ES)17,18 19. An ecosystem approach starts from a recognition that these different social costs 
and benefits derive from land and natural capital within particular places. An ESP aims to maximise 
the total sustainable social value of rural land from marketed and non-marketed ES. This is not to 
imply that this is a measurable target, but it represents a clear goal.   
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We propose that this could be achieved through two mechanisms, for which we already have 
successful analogues. Firstly, an ESP would support Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) markets 
where feasible and equitable. However, in practice many of the services provided by ecosystems 
have significant public good characteristics rendering markets unfeasible. Thus, secondly, ES would 
be procured by government on behalf of the public. Following the principle of subsidiarity20 this 
would operate through multi-level governance (Figure 2). We propose a two tier system, the former 
concentrating on services of national significance, the latter reflecting local priorities determined 
within a local decision-making framework.   
 
Of course, an ESP does not cover all of the issues that would be dealt with by a conventional 
agricultural policy.  Issues of food quality, the regulation of chemical use, livestock and plant disease, 
animal welfare, research, development and extension of technology and information, the variability 
of farm incomes or dealing with natural disasters would still need to be addressed through other 
policy instruments.   
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1|Alternative approaches to rural land use policy.  Two illustrative scenarios for the value 
derived from land under policies focused on agriculture versus those focused on ecosystem services. 
Under policies focussed on agriculture, value is generated by the production and trade of 
agricultural products, however this often imposes social costs in the form of externalities such as 
nutrient emissions, greenhouse gas emissions, increased flood risk, and biodiversity loss. Under 
policies focused on ecosystem services, greater social value is realised through the strategic 
combination of agricultural production and ecosystem services. This reduces the value derived from 
agricultural production to some extent due to the re-purposing of agricultural land and adaptation of 
agricultural systems. However social value increases to a much greater extent through co-benefits 
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including flood mitigation, carbon sequestration and biodiversity protection. A well-designed ESP 
shares this additional value between farmers and the wider public through judicious application of 
the 'polluter pays' and the 'provider gets' principles. 
 
Markets for Ecosystem Services 
There has been intense interest in the potential for the use of PES in order to incentivise their 
delivery over the past twenty years19, 21. There are some successful examples of PES schemes where 
beneficiaries pay producers directly for the delivery of a defined service.  In the west of England, 
South West Water has run a reverse auction to select farmers to adopt changes in land management 
that would reduce emissions into watercourses from livestock production and so reduce South West 
Water’s water treatment costs.  Despite successful examples, in practice the great majority of PES 
payments come from taxes and fees 22. Some limitations to PES, such as regulatory limits, shifting 
responsibility or crowding-out can be addressed 24, 23 and initiatives are underway to develop new 
approaches, such as better technical information or co-ordination amongst potential buyers 24. But 
the potential for markets will be limited in the foreseeable future. The primary focus of an ESP will 
thus be on public procurement.  
 
National procurement to meet national objectives  
A first stage in the implementation of procurement funds is a clear definition of the rights and duties 
in the management of the natural environment. This sets minimum standards, such as for water 
quality, enforced through regulatory processes under the polluter pays principle. But the provision 
of other ES, such as biodiversity or public access, is typically regarded a public good and so justifies 
payment under the provider gets principle25. 
 
National government would procure ES to achieve national objectives. Such targets would include 
those agreed under international agreements, such as under the Convention on Biological Diversity 
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(CBD) or the Paris Agreement on climate change.  This would help to avoid shortfalls such as some 
countries’ looming failure to meet the Aichi Targets26.  Procurement would also support the 
management of natural capital of national importance, such as in national parks. We anticipate a 
series of funds, each with a specific focus and remit, such as for biodiversity conservation or 
greenhouse gas mitigation.   
 
The procurement approach would build on the extensive experience from the implementation of 
agri-environment schemes, especially in the EU, USA and Australia 27,28, and from experience with 
PES schemes 23. Not all interventions are successful, but many are.  For instance, a 2007 systematic 
review of 29 studies incorporating data for 15 farmland bird species in the UK found that there were 
significantly higher winter densities of farmland birds on fields under agri-environment schemes 
than on conventionally-managed fields 29. This points to a number of design and implementation 
aspects that can be incorporated into the approach. These include various forms of coordination, 
such as partnerships30 or farmer co-operatives 31,32, competitive bidding 33,34 and payment by results 
35,36.  The Conservation Reserve Program, implemented in the United States since 1985, provides 
conservation benefits through the voluntary retirement of agricultural land.  Bids are selected 
through a competitive discriminatory auction that ranks bids against an Environmental Benefits 
Index that represents both environmental characteristics as well as the amount of funding sought by 
the landholder 33. Given the uncertainty in predicting the outcomes of interventions in ecosystems, 
procurement funds would operate adaptively, monitoring outcomes, accumulating information on 
the methods and approaches that are more effective in delivering the relevant ES. 
 
While this provides an important precedent in the land use sector, examples of large scale public 
procurement of public goods also exist in other sectors. For example, competitively tendered public 
funding for research and innovation has existed for decades. Similar to procurement funding under 
an ESP, public funding for research and innovation seeks to realise latent value and provide public 
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goods that would otherwise be underprovided by markets. Furthermore, research and innovation 
funding is allocated at levels of organisation that are similar to that required for an ESP in the land 
sector. While individual researchers can apply for research and innovation funding, in most cases, 
research groups, departments, or even businesses provide efficiency gains in the realisation of 
research objectives.  
 
The ESP approach would go beyond a narrow focus on farmers37. While farmers and other land 
managers will generally be best placed to know about the opportunities and costs of ES delivery, 
payments could also be made to other stakeholders, such as non-profit organisations38, potentially 
providing payments for research, mediation or facilitation.  There is also the potential to adopt a 
wider range of mechanisms, such as for land purchase or conservation covenants39 to secure long 
term protection for natural capital.  
 
Local procurement to reflect local priorities 
A second tier of public procurement would be implemented at a local level.  National government 
has limited information about local patterns of demand for ES, the potential for integration amongst 
them, or the direct and opportunity costs of providing them. This requires the development of Local 
Environmental Governance Organisations (LEGOs) (See Box 1) to represent local priorities in the 
delivery of ES and implement local procurement schemes.  LEGOs would be funded primarily from 
general taxation and some system of fiscal transfers would be required to allocate amongst local 
areas 40 but they could also have powers to raise their own funds locally where there is popular 
support for increased provision or through a tourist tax in areas  attractive to tourists.   
 
 
Box 1 | Local Environmental Governance Organisations 
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In principle, a LEGO would act like a board of trustees of a non-profit organisation seeking to 
secure the best long term social value of ES delivered to the local community, maintaining the 
value of the natural capital over time 41. Trustees would be democratically appointed either by 
direct election or by local councils. They would thus be locally accountable, but would also be 
subject to rules and procedures set out in national legislation that apply as a condition of the 
national funding. 
 
LEGOs could focus on ES that have immediate and evident value to a local community, such as 
landscapes, biodiversity and public access. But they could also fill in gaps that are left after the 
implementation of PES markets and procurement by national funds. This might include literally 
filling gaps by connecting adjacent areas of habitat that have been supported by national funds to 
create larger-scale biodiversity conservation or recreational areas.   
 
LEGOs would operate across areas of shared interests where ecosystem management can be 
enhanced through spatial co-ordination, such as catchments, in relatively homogeneous 
environments or areas with a common culture or outlook. At the same time, areas need to be of 
sufficient scale to justify professional administration. In practice, the scale and intensity of the 
operation is likely to vary from region to region, depending on the social value of the 
environmental assets present and the level of conflict over them. This would balance transactions 




While we are not aware of countries that have introduced a comprehensive system of this sort, 
there are general principles42,43 and local case studies44,45,46 that offer the basis for its development.  
An example is provided by the case of Kristianstads Vattenrike, a river basin in Sweden of over 1,000 
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km2, which has been designated as a Biosphere Reserve.  The area provides a broad range of 
ecosystem services and is managed by a municipal organisation that adopts an adaptive approach, 
working in collaboration with farmers, conservation organisations, local businesses and others 47.   
 
Various organisations currently work as partnerships in the procurement and delivery of ecosystem 
and other services at local scales, and these demonstrate the potential for LEGOs, such as Local 
Enterprise Partnerships 48, Landscape Partnerships 49, Catchment Partnerships50 and Nature 
Improvement Areas 51 in the UK.  An ESP would build on these local governance structures. The 
extensive experience with community-based natural resource management such as in Australasia 
points particularly to the need for the development of social and human capital52 alongside 
developments in natural capital. This indicates that local governance organisations will take time to 
develop their full institutional roles through multiple modes of authority53.  
 
One possible model is that of National Park Authorities (NPAs) in Great Britain54,55 where the land is 
privately owned and managed and where there are substantial local populations working and 
residing within park boundaries. NPA members are drawn from local communities but NPAs receive 
national funding and are required to follow national procedures and guidelines. Under an ESP, the 
approach would be extended across all areas.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Figure 2| A governance framework for an Ecosystem Services Policy. Operation at a national level 
gives funds the opportunity to select the most cost-effective opportunities nationally. Thus for 
instance, it does not matter where carbon sequestration or greenhouse gas mitigation takes place, 
and so there is a benefit from identifying the most cost-effective options nationally. We anticipate 
that national funds will generally not enter into contracts with individual landholders. Rather, 
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programme funding arrangements56 would be developed with collective organisations that can then 
take on contracts with individuals. This will enable national funders and collective organisations to 
develop close and trusting working relationships over time.  LEGOs draw on funding from both 
national and local sources. They may either provide programme funding to local collective 
organisations or may enter into contracts with individuals.  Collective organisations could be groups 
of landholders working together, non-profit organisations or bespoke partnerships responding to 
particular contexts. Their legal status needs to be sufficiently formal to ensure long term 
sustainability. Non-profit organisations may raise funds from membership fees and donations in 
addition to public funding. Collective organisations may also be able to generate income from 
commercial activities operating alongside their public interest role. Where market-based 
opportunities generate wider social co-benefits, public procurement funding might be matched with 
private payments. Individual landholders may build a portfolio of contracts with national and/or 
local funds to deliver a range of ES. Evidence suggests that there are significant synergies and trade-
offs in the provision of ES57. These will be most apparent to individual landholders working 
collectively or individually who are best informed as to the costs and potentials for integrating 
delivery on the ground.  
 
The way forward 
An ESP has potential to generate greater and more sustainable social benefits from rural land than 
current policies do. National governments need to set out a vision for ESP design and 
implementation. An ESP would be relatively complex to manage and a governing department would, 
inter alia, have to adaptively balance funding amongst support for PES schemes, the various 
procurement funds and local level governance. But there is extensive prior experience with the 
delivery of complex agricultural policies that have regulated land uses and made payments to 
individual farmers that demonstrates these capabilities.  
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The ESP would need to be implemented incrementally over a defined and planned period to avoid 
major disruptions that could be a source of both social and environmental losses. Rapid change 
could provoke bankruptcies and land abandonment with major costs both on the agricultural 
community and on the local environment.  Some agricultural systems that maintain valued 
landscapes and habitats are wholly dependent on subsidies and could not continue without them. 
For example, areas are defined in the European Union as High Nature Value farmland where 
biodiversity is linked with the continuation of farming on certain types of land and the maintenance 
of specific farming systems.  Such areas would be eligible for payment in relation to the landscape 
and biodiversity benefits that continued farming delivers.   
 
Where substantial levels of funding are already committed to agriculture, much can be achieved by 
redirecting funds.  For instance, the intention to shift funds in this way after Brexit has been 
signalled by the UK government13. The periodic reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy in the 
European Union might also provide opportunities for shifting the focus from agriculture to 
ecosystem services 59.  
 
National governments will need to build political support. The point was made earlier that 
agricultural policies have had strong support from agricultural lobbies. There is then a need to 
demonstrate the potential benefits that can be attained from an ESP and to reassure others that the 
changes will be acceptable. There will, of course, still be gainers and losers; some farmers would lose 
from the removal of subsidies under current agricultural policies, but an ESP would also provide new 
opportunities for diversification and entry into the sector. There thus needs to be a debate about 
the arrangements for change.  
 
The building blocks for ESPs already exist. The challenge is to combine these components into a 
coherent overarching policy. This would incur significant transactions costs, especially in the initial 
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stages of the policy, but we envisage that the benefits of an ESP would substantially outweigh their 
costs over time.  
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